Varieties of imperial decline - the Nicaraguan election
Campaigning manoeuvres towards the
Nicaraguan presidential elections scheduled for November this year
began in 2004, shortly after the municipal elections of that year. In
those elections the FSLN and its allies in the Convergencia Nacional
made a marked advance, winning 87 out of 153 municipal authorities,
including Managua and most of the main departmental capitals. From that
point on, right wing and centrist politicans as well as the US embassy
have been trying to work out alliances and propaganda formulas to
defeat the FSLN in the presidential elections of 2006.
Remarks by death-squad godfather and US intelligence supremo John
Negroponte in early March that the US is watching with concern the
election campaign in Nicaragua signalled a sharp escalation in
interventions by the US ambassador, Paul Trivelli. Trivelli has been
bolstered by leading figures from the Bush administration and its
supporters. Over the last few months, people like Otto Reich, Robert
Zoellick, Thomas Shannon and, lately, Jean Kirkpatrick have passed
through Managua to reinforce Trivelli's efforts to discredit Daniel
Ortega and defeat the FSLN.
Main parties and candidates
The main parties involved in the current election battle are the
FSLN/Convergencia Nacional, the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC), the
Liberal Alliance for Nicaragua (ALN) allied with Nicaragua's small
Conservative Party and the Alianza Herty 2006. The presidential
candidate for the FSLN-led Convergencia is Daniel Ortega Saavedra. For
the PLC it is Jose Rizo Castellon, a close ally of disgraced former
president Arnoldo Aleman. The ALN candidate is leading businessman
Eduardo Montealegre. Former mayor of Managua Herty Lewites is the
candidate for the Alianza Herty 2006, which is supported by the
Movimiento Renovador Sandinista, currently led by Dora Maria Tellez.
Of these candidates, the Liberal party candidates represent the
country's right-wing. The FSLN/Convergencia represents the countries
left-wing with some leading centrist nationalist politicians from other
parties like Agustin Jarquin, Miriam Arguello and Jaime Norales. Herty
Lewites has formed a centrist social democratic alliance based on a
managerial and media class formed mainly of dissident sandinistas who
reject the leadership of Daniel Ortega.
Support for these candidates seems to vary somewhat from one poll to
the next but recent polls by the generally well-regarded Borges and
Associates put Montealegre at around 30%, with Ortega and Lewites both
on around 25%. In the recent elections for the Autonomous Regions of
the Atlantic Coast, neither Montealegre nor Lewites performed well.
That vote was split quite evenly between the PLC and their allies
and the FSLN and its allies. A good augury for the FSLN since the
Atlantic Coast traditionally favours the Liberal parties.
Many people fail to realise that the Liberal governments of Arnoldo
Aleman and Enrique Bolanos came to power based on an alliance of
various Liberal parties. Aleman's great political achievement was to
unify these fractious groups into one powerful national alliance. Once
President Bolanos turned against Aleman through 2002 and facilitated
his trial and imprisonment for corruption, that alliance fell
irrevocably into pieces. The competing factions of the Nicaraguan right
loath each other almost as much as they detest the sandinista FSLN.
Remaking the alliance may well be impossible without Aleman's blessing.
Role of the US embassy
US ambassador Paul Trivelli is repeating the performance he gave when
he served in the US embassy in San Salvador, helping defeat the FMLN in
elections there. He has openly criticised Daniel Ortega and leading PLC
politicians while clearly blessing Montealegre and centrist social
democrat Herty Lewites. The aim of US intervention in the election is
to unify the right and to divide the left and centre. The main obstacle
to unification of the right wing parties is the looming presence of
ex-Prsident Arnoldo Aleman. Although under house arrest, Aleman
continues to dominate the PLC and alienate potential alliances. On the
other hand, Trivelli's tacit support for Lewites has yielded still
uncertain results. It is far from clear that the blessing of the US
ambassador is helpful for Lewites candidacy.
Apart from ambassador Trivelli's blatant public interventions, US
government money is being channelled into the Nicaraguan electoral
process through US quangos like the International Republican Institute,
the National Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for
Democracy. Some of the money is disbursed to local Nicaraguan NGOs like
Hagamos Democracia and Etica y Transparencia, among others. Even more
controversially, ambassador Trivelli has suggested that US government
funds might finance primary votes for right-wing Nicaraguan political
parties so as to produce an agreed single candidate. As Orlando
Tardencilla of the tiny Alternativa Cristiana has pointed out, such a
move would clearly contravene Nicaraguan law.
Intervention by US embassy personnel is likely to increase as the
campaign intensifies nearer the actual vote in November. Trivelli has
already given interviews in which he juxtaposes US preference for
candidates like Montealegre and Lewites with the dependency of most
Nicaraguans on family remittances from relatives in the United States.
That kind of veiled threat is likely to be repeated insistently as the
November vote draws near. Whether Trivelli will stoop to outright
public campaigning for the preferred US candidate as his predecessor
Oliver Garza did for Enrique Bolanos in 2001 remains to be seen.
Embassy rhetoric paints Montealegre and Lewites as promoting democracy.
In contrast Ortega and leading PLC politicians are cast as sinister
threats to democracy, a game in which both Montealegre and Lewites
actively collude. But by choosing as their own candidate Jose Rizo
Castellon, the PLC have caused Trivelli a dilemma. Rizo is an intimate
ally of Arnoldo Aleman, but has somehow managed to keep a cleaner image
than most of the other leading PLC politicians. It will be hard for
Trivelli and his team to smear Rizo, which makes it harder for their
preferred candidate Montealegre to consolidate support for himself. In
the end the US government will be satisfied if they can stop the FSLN
led by Daniel Ortega and will swallow a Rizo presidency with little
difficulty, as a recent meeting between Trivelli and the PLC indicates.
Role of the social democrat managerial class
Key figures in the US embassy's anti-sandinista strategy paradoxically
include several leading former FSLN members. Herty Lewites is backed by
Luis Carrion, Victor Tirado, and Victor Hugo Tinoco, behind them stand
respected figures like Henry Ruiz and Gioconda Belli. Other leading
former sandinistas who have declared support for Lewites' candidacy
over the last few months include Monica Baltodano and Dora Maria
Tellez. With such an array of former leading sandinista figures one
might have thought that Lewites could easily have outmanoeuvred Daniel
Ortega within the FSLN. But he could not and was unanimously expelled
from the party by its General Assembly along with Victor Hugo Tinoco in
early 2005.
The political base of these figures is narrow, mostly in the NGO and
media managerial classes. They share it with other sandinista
dissidents who formed the Movimiento Renovadora Sandinista (MRS) in the
mid 1990s under Sergio Ramirez. Lewites has avoided defining a
political platform, limiting himself to attacks on Daniel Ortega and
blurring the differences between himself and his former FSLN
colleagues. The arguments around the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) were a clear example of that. During the run up to
the vote in the legislature, Lewites resolutely refused to define his
position, which by clear implication was pro-CAFTA. Subsequently he and
his supporters have tried to confuse people by falsely alleging that
the FSLN itself supported CAFTA.
El Nuevo Diario journalist Carlos Chamorro did just that in his widely
circulated March interview with ambassador Trivelli.(1) In fact, the
FSLN fiercely opposed CAFTA with all its deputies voting against when
the treaty came to the legislature for ratification last year.
Subsequently, the FSLN struck a legislative deal with the PLC on laws
to protect vulnerable sectors of the Nicaraguan economy against the
effects of the treaty. So both Lewites and Montealegre lost no time in
asserting that the FSLN supported CAFTA after all.
Such disingenuous manipulation is routine in Nicaraguan politics but
indicates the fundamental weakness of Lewites' candidacy. He is an
opportunist waiting for whatever media puff he can catch to propel his
candidacy and sustain momentum through to November. His contradictions
undermine him. He accuses the FSLN of shameless deals with the PLC,
while he himself is relentlessly wheeling and dealing in meetings with
Eduardo Montealegre, with ambassador Trivelli, and sundry minor
political players who may add lustre or substance to his candidacy. He
has a reasonably solid power base in Managua but a shaky presence
nationally which may or may not hold firm until the November vote.
A questionable land deal towards the end of Lewites' period as mayor of
Managua may still dog his candidacy despite attempts by his supporters
to dismiss the allegations as spurious. It is not unfair to note that
Lewites' constant demands that his candidacy not be impugned by the
Supreme Electoral Council serve as a very handy gambit to avoid facing
that allegation in the courts. In any case, it remains to be seen how
serious a candidacy Lewites is able to mount come November and how
damaging to the FSLN his role as a spoiler will be. After heading
voting preference polls through 2005, recent polls show Lewites losing
ground, running level with Daniel Ortega - both well behind Eduardo
Montealegre. However, until candidacies and alliances are better
defined polling results mean little. Lewites may recover or may fade
further, especially if he starts to lose support in his base, the
capital Managua.
Venezuela - Chavez's new deal
A recent deal negotiated via the FSLN to supply Nicaraguan municipal
authorities with low-cost fuel and fertilizer from Venezuela may alter
the traditional dynamics of Nicaragua's presidential vote this year. A
visit by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to Nicaragua prior to the
poll is likely, possibly for the July 19th anniversary of the overthrow
of the Somoza dictatorship. The likelihood is that these factors will
boost the perception that the FSLN offers a real alternative to the
chronic policy failures of 16 years of faith-based neo-liberal
gobbledy-gook applied by governments supported by US administrations in
Washington.
This would demonstrate that Nicaragua has other options than simply
doing as it is told by the United States government. Right-wing
accusations of intervention by the Chavez administration in Nicaragua's
internal affairs ring irremediably hollow given the welcome Liberal
politicans gave former remarks by Salavadoran president ARENA
politician Armando Calderon Sol criticising the FSLN and Daniel Ortega.
The desperation of Liberal party politicians to smear the FSLN is
evident in absurd accusations that Venezuela is bankrolling the FSLN to
the tune of US$50 million.
Miguel Gomez, Venezuelan ambassador in Managua has insisted the
Venezuelan government is limiting its support to material aid to
Nicaragua. The low cost fuel and fertilizer supplies will ease the
country's fuel price crisis and guarantee fertilizer at affordable
prices for producers in the coming planting season that should begin
with the May rains. Whether Venezuela's support for Nicaragua will
boost support for the FSLN may depend on how sharply the energy crisis
develops through the rest of 2006. Clearly the US government has no
positive alternative with which to match the offer of energy price
support from Venezuela.
Bogeymen, extortion and bluff-calling
Nicaragua has probably never had an election free from outside
interference. This year the usual patterns will be repeated. Daniel
Ortega and the FSLN will be demonized despite their inestimable
contribution to the development of democratic politics in Nicaragua. US
governments will continue their standard protection racket propaganda
"wouldn't want anything to happen to those visa quotas and those
important family remittances now, would you....?" Right-wing
politicians will somehow whitewash the lamentable failure of 16 years
of government by their parties to redeem the misery endured by a
population of whom over 70% live in poverty. Opportunist maverick Herty
Lewites will do well to avoid repeating the failure of former
Vice-President Sergio Ramirez in 1995.
The recent massive demonstrations in the US by immigrants from Latin
American countries indicate a change of mood among Latin American
people concerning their relations with the United States. This may have
as much to do with the grinding imperatives of their daily battles to
survive in the United States as with the clear trend against pro-US
government politicians throughout Latin America. But the days of
unquestioning submission to US government wishes are over. The
Nicaraguan election may or may not reinforce and confirm that message.
However, both in regional and in domestic political terms Nicaragua's
November 2006 presidential elections are likely to mark the end of the
era of straitjacket neo-liberal policies. Even if a US government
approved candidate wins they will only do so in a context where US
government policy formulae have no future. The energy crisis and the
environmental crisis indicated by increasingly violent hurricane
seasons make a continuance of neo-liberal economic and social policies
untenable. Strike action by teachers, healthcare workers and public
transport services over the last twelve months indicate that ordinary
people's tolerance of miserable poverty is over.
All these factors should favour the FSLN, hence the US government's
aggressive desperation to intervene and avoid a victory for Daniel
Ortega. But it will not be enough simply to block Ortega. To win
decisively in Nicaragua, the US has to ensure a heavy defeat for the
FSLN in the legislative elections which will take place simultaneously
with the presidential elections, As in El Salvador with the FMLN, that
is something out of their reach. Already this year's electoral
campaigning in Nicaragua is marking another steady downward ratchet in
the United States' imperial decline.
NOTES
1. "Injerencismo y veto" Carlos Chamorro, EL Nuevo Diario, March 27th
2006